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The Industrial Cooperation Contract in East-West Trade
Andrzej Szumaifski *
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION CONTRACT
The industrial cooperation contract is considered to be one of the most
important legal institutions in the East-West trade. In the early 1960s,
this institution began to be used in contractual practice between the en-
terprises of capitalist and socialist states. The 1970s witnessed particular
and extensive development of this type of contract. Even the cooling of
political and economical relations between East and West in the late
1970s and early 1980s had no considerable negative effect on the signifi-
cance of industrial cooperation contracts in the trade between states be-
longing to different socio-economic systems.1
The popularity of the industrial cooperation contract stems from ad-
vantages arising from the very phenomenon of international industrial
cooperation. The socialist state considers industrial cooperation with a
highly developed capitalist state a means of securing rapid economic
modernization and development. Industrial cooperation reduces the
technological gap that the socialist experiences vis-A-vis capitalist states.
In addition, the socialist state considers this kind of cooperation a vehicle
to stimulate its exports to the West. Cooperation secures the advanta-
geous structure of such exports, and consequently may improve the bal-
ance of payments in relation to the West.
Economic improvement is considerable due to all the new technol-
ogy provided by the Western partner in the shape of licenses and know-
how which reaches the socialist state. This influx reduces the research
and development costs of the socialist partner and stimulates implemen-
tation of technical innovations. The new technological and organiza-
tional methods are often responsible for a rise in quality, competitive
capacity and attractiveness of products manufactured in the socialist
state. These methods frequently lead to a reduction of raw materials
consumption, and lay the foundation for technical and organizational
progress at the national as well as enterprise level. Such progress allows
* Assistant Professor to the Chair of Trade Law of Jagiellonian University, Krak6w, Poland.
1 See, eg., Perlmutter, The Future of East-West Industrial Cooperation, in POLISH-US INDUS-
TRIAL COOPERATION IN THE 1980S 187 (P. Marer & E. Tabczyfiski eds. 1981); Moecke, Recht-
sfragen der Kooperation mit Polen aus der deutscher Sicht, in RECHTSFRAGEN DER DEUTSCH-
POLNISCHEN WIRTSCHAFrSBEZIEHUNGEN 55 (W. von Marschall ed.).
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the state to meet native consumption needs more fully,2 and to advanta-
geously affect the restructuring of the socialist economy, contributing to
a gradual decrease in foreign indebtedness.3
Often Western economic units cooperate with Eastern enterprises in
order to extend raw material supplies, as well as to open new markets.
Western enterprises are attracted by the relatively lower production
costs, especially in the area of labor, that are characteristic of the less
industrialized countries. This labor factor allows Western enterprises to
shift less profitable production processes to Eastern states, thereby free-
ing domestic production capacity for more profitable types of manufac-
ture. Moreover, production responsible for greater environmental
pollution is doubtlessly more likely to be shifted somewhere else 4-such
as to Eastern states.
These economic advantages have resulted in a convenient legal pat-
tern in industrial cooperation agreements concluded between Eastern
and Western governments; a pattern particularly found in long term con-
tracts for economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation which
are included in the category of public international law contracts.5 Gov-
ernment safeguards that extend to increased import and export quotas, as
well as those pertaining to tariffs vis-A-vis trade transactions recognized
as industrial cooperation, reflect this convenient pattern.
The pattern does not, however, provide for precise forms of coopera-
tion. In practice the form may be that of a simple draw-back, subcon-
tract or license for resultant products. The form may be an exchange of
complete plants or production lines for payment in resultant products, or
it may be more complicated such as coproduction and joint ventures.6
East-West industrial cooperation is expected to materialize in the
2 See, e.g., S. SZCZYPIORSKI, NOWOCZESNE FROMY I METHODY WYMIANY
MIDZYNARODOWEJ (NEW FORMS AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE) 153 (1980);
A. WIECZORKIEWICz, KOOPERACJA PRZEMYSLOWA POLAKI Z ROZWINFTYMI KRAJAMI KAPITAL-
ISTYCZNYMI (INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION OF POLAND WITH DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES)
63-68 (1980); J. NYKRYN, MEZINARODNI PRUMYSLOVA KOOPERACE (INTERNATIONAL INDUS-
TRIAL COOPERATION) 37-43, 91-94 (Polish trans. 1975).
3 Marcus & Grushin, How to Negotiate Countertrade Deals, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING
267 (D. D. Bradlow ed. 1986).
4 S. SZCZYPIORSKI, supra note 2, at 153-54; A. WIECZORKIEWIcZ, supra note 2, at 63-68.
5 Jakubowski, Some Legal Aspects of Industrial Cooperation in East-West Relations, 163
RUCUEIL DES COURS 277-78 (1979); K. MICHALOWSKA-GORYWODA, PRAWNO-INSTYTUCJONALNE
PODSTAWY WSPLPRACY GOSPODARCZEJ WESCH6D-ZACH6D (LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BASIS
OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION) 55-170 (1984); Boruslawskij, in PRAWOWYJE FORMY
NAUTSCHNOVO-TECHNITSCHESKOVO I PROMYSCHLENNO - EKONOMITSCHESKOVO SOTRUDNIT-
SCHESTWA SSSR KAPITALISTITSCHESKIMI STRANAMI (LEGAL FORMS OF SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL
AND INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC COOPERATION OF THE USSR WITH CAPITALIST COUNTRIES) 95-104
(1980) [hereinafter PRAWOWYJE FORMY].
6 F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY, INDUSTRIELLE KOOPERATION ZWISCHEN OST UND WEST
24-25, 39-41 (1977).
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shape of enterprises formed on the basis of private law contracts con-
cluded among potential contractors. These enterprises are the entities
which decide the form that the cooperation will take. Consequently, co-
operation is limited by such circumstances as production possibilities;
technological and organizational levels; raw materials availability; and
market conditioning.
Both Western and Eastern enterprises tend to qualify simple trade
transactions, such as sale and delivery, as industrial cooperation con-
tracts. This classification artifically expands the notion of industrial co-
operation. In view of this tendency, it has become urgent to precisely
define the terms "international industrial cooperation" and "industrial
cooperation contract" in East-West relations.
The problem is not simple, as no definition has been accepted, in
either doctrine or practice by both East and West. Analysis indicates
that industrial cooperation may make up a separate economic institution
with a scope narrower than that of its etymological counterpart, the
Latin word "cooperare.' ' 7 Attempts to arrive at the essence of interna-
tional industrial cooperation invariably refer to improvised drafts of defi-
nition suggested by conference specialized United Nations ("UN")
organizations such as the Committee on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD") or the Economic Commission for Europe ("ECE").8 In
the definition drafts, the contract-a legal category-is invoked to ex-
plain economic phenomenon. It would be of no avail, therefore, to create
two separate definitions for the word "cooperation" in international in-
7 U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, ANALYTICAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL COOP-
ERATION AMONG ECE CoUTmIEs, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/844/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.75.II.11
(1973) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL REPORT]; Starr, Evolving Patterns of East-West Business Transac-
tions: Introductory Note on Cooperation Agreements, in EAST-WEST BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 490
(R. Starr ed. 1974); K. BoLz & B. KUNZE, WIRTSCHAFrSBEZIE-HUNGEN ZWISCHEN OST UND
WEST-HANDEL UND KOOPERTION 21 (1974); Maximova, Industrial Cooperation between Socialist
and Capitalist Countries: Forms, Trends and Problems, in EAS-WEsT COOPERATION IN BUSINESS,
INTERFIRM STUDIES 16 (C.T. Sanders ed. 1977); McMillan, Forms and Dimensions of East-West
Cooperations, in EAsT-WEsr COOPERATION IN BUSINESS, INTERFIRM STUDIES, supra this note at
20; M. DOBROCZYASKI & R. LAWNICZAK, POLITYKA EKONOMICZAN W STOSUNKACH WSCH6D-
SACH+OD (ECONOMIC POLICY IN EAsT-WESr RELATIONS) 325 (1981); Enderlein & V6Iter, Der
Kooperationsvertrag, in HANDBUCH DER AUSSENHANDELSVETRAGE DER DDR 219-23 (1982); H.
H. HILL, EAST-WEST TRADE, INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 166
(1984).
8 ANALYTICAL REPORT, supra note 7; U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
THE SCOPE OF TRADE-CREATING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AT THE ENTERPRISE LEVEL BE-
TWEEN COUNTRIES HAVING DIFFERENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/490/Rev.1, 4 (1975) [hereinafter THE SCOPE OF TRADE-CREATING INDUSTRIAL COOPER-
ATION]; U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, EAST-WESrT INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION,
U.N. Doc. ECE/Trade/132, U.N. Sales No. E.79.II.E.25 (1979) [hereinafter EAST-WEST INDUS-
TRIAL COOPERATION].
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dustrial cooperation and industrial cooperation contracts in East-West
relations.
The terms found in the most representative document generalizing
contractual practice in industrial cooperation will be used in this Article.
This document is the 1976 ECE Guide on Drawing Up International
Contracts on Industrial Cooperation ("ECE Guide").9 The ECE Guide
provides for the following definition:
[T]he contract of industrial cooperation means operations which
go beyond the straightforward sale on purchase of goods and services
and which involve the creation between parties belonging to different
countries--of a lasting community of interests designed to provide the
parties with mutual advantages. Such contracts relate to, inter alia,
the following:
1. transfer of technology and of technical experience,
2. cooperation in the field of production including, where appropri-
ate, cooperation in research and development in the specialization of
production,
3. cooperation in developing natural resources, and
4. joint marketing or marketing on joint account, in the countries of
parties to the contract or in the third markets, of the products of inter-
national cooperation. 10
This definition draft is a starting point for the following analysis.
This Article starts with a review of contracts recognized as industrial
cooperation contracts in contractual practice, then goes on to the content
of the model of industrial cooperation contract, and concludes with the
question of legal regulation of contract in international and domestic law.
II. CONTRACTS CONSIDERED INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
CONTRACTS IN CONTRACTUAL PRACTICE
Despite essential differences in legal content, various types of con-
tracts are deemed industrial cooperation contracts in contractual prac-
tice. All these contracts are reflective of the economic phenomenon
known as international industrial cooperation. As there are a large
number of these contracts, it would advisable to systematically analyze
them to arrive at their more precise image. Three separate categories
capable of covering all the industrial cooperation contracts occur. These
categories include steered production, contracts for coproduction and
joint venture contracts.
In steered production contracts, the economically stronger party
9 U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, ECE GUIDE ON DRAWING UP INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTRACTS OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION OF 1976, U.N. Doc. ECE/Trade/124, 4
[hereinafter ECE GUIDE].
10 Id.
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(usually the Western party), on account of its earlier contributions in
shape of licences, know-how, equipment or even complete industrial
structures, has a direct influence on the production of cooperative ele-
ments or final products manufactured by the economically weaker party.
The stronger party receives compensation for earlier contributions in the
form of an equivalent supply of a produced commodity.
In coproduction contracts, the parties' economic potentials closely
approximate each other. As a result, they can establish closer economic
cooperation such as separate production of specialized components of the
final product.
In joint venture contracts, partners fully integrate their economic
activities by joint actions. As a result, the partners' economic objectives
are more than convergent-which is typical of the aforementioned sys-
tems-but actually nondivisible.11 Joint actions may often be bound by
forming certain organizational structures.
4. Cooperation Contract within the Frame of Steered Production
(1) Subcontracting
Subcontracting is the simplest type of international industrial coop-
eration contract. In this contract the economically weaker partner
("subcontractor") produces and subsequently delivers an agreed quantity
of semimanufactured or finished goods to the stronger partner ("contrac-
tor" or "principal"). To achieve this effect, the principal is expected to
provide the weaker partner with technology, machinery, equipment and
sometimes raw materials.12 The relative simplicity of the principal's obli-
gations differentiates subcontracting from other types of cooperation
contracts in the area of steered production.
Subcontracting exemplifies the type of contract in which the eco-
nomic essence of industrial cooperation is most apparent as the effects of
economic activity of one party are implemented in the economic activity
of the other party.' 3 This results from the production process of the spe-
cific commodity being divided between the two. Production steering in
the form of the transfer of technology is determinative of the synchroni-
zation of industrial cooperation, and thereby forms a complementary
system.
Additional operations such as technical supervision, instruction of
subsuppliers' employees, and subsuppliers themselves, strengthen the
II THE SCOPE OF TRADE-CREATING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, supra note 8, 10.
12 G. FARIAT, DROIT ECONOMIQUE 141 (1971).
13 U.N. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, SUBCONTRACTING FOR MODERN-
IZING ECONOMIES 46 (1974); INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTING, A NEW FORM OF INVESTMENT
13-15, 47-49 (D. Gerndis ed. 1980).
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nexus between the partners' durable community of interests.14 Durabil-
ity of the enterprise is not limited by arbitrary time criteria, but only by
the continuation of the partners' ability to gain mutual advantage from
the relationship. The arrangement and content of tasks lead to the con-
clusion that without a longer cooperation period, optimal economic con-
ditions could hardly be affected.
Subcontracting is applicable mostly in cases when the partners con-
siderably differ in their economic potentials. Such a situation is charac-
teristic for East-West industrial cooperation in which the stronger
Western partner-the principal- provides modern technology and
methods of organization while the weaker Eastern partner-the subcon-
tractor-guarantees raw materials and lower production costs. 5
(2) Production Made to Order and Draw-Back
Two other simple forms of joint actions should be differentiated
from subcontracting. These forms are production made to order and
draw-back. In production made to order (Auftragsfertigung), the princi-
pal orders production of a specific commodity, and the subcontractor
performs using exclusively its own technology, raw materials, machinery,
equipment and employees. 6 As there is no division of the production
process, there is no need to synchronize the manufacturing process. Pro-
duction is autonomous, performed entirely within the enterprise receiv-
ing the order. The principal has no impact on the course of production
because no contributions are provided to further the manufacturing pro-
cess. The principal is limited to paying for finished products. As a re-
sult, no complementary relationship, and consequently no lasting
community of interests is created. For these reasons production made to
order cannot be deemed true industrial cooperation.
Draw-back (Lohnverredlung) is characterized by the subcontractor's
contribution of labor only. 7 First, improved product components or fin-
ished goods are returned to the principal, who pays for the labor. Unlike
14 W. VON LINGELSHEIM-SEIBICKE, KOOPERATION MIT UNTERNEHMEN IN STAATSHANDEL-
SLXNDERN OSTEUROPA, EINE EINFOHRUNG IN DIE PRAXIS 70 (1974); M. SCHMITT, INDUS-
TRIELLE OST-WEST KOOPERATION, PROBLEME UND PERSPEKTIVEN 70 (1974); F. LEVCIK & J.
STANKOVSKY, supra note 6, at 53; V. MAKEVICH, EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE 106 (1981); Enderlein & Vd1ter, supra note 7, at 220.
15 W. VON LINGELSHEIM-SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 70-72.
16 Enderlein & V61ter, supra note 7, at 220-21; F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY, supra note 6, at
53-54; E. SCHENK, B. KLOMPER, N. LEISE & D. WORSTER, INDUSTRIELLE OST-WEST KOOPERA-
TION 11 (1977); K. BOLZ & B. KUNZE, supra note 7, at 21-31.
17 ANALYTICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-8; EAST-WEST INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, Supra
note 8, at 85-89; M. SCHMITT, supra note 14, at 81-82. See also U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION
FOR EUROPE, ECE GUIDE FOR USE IN DRAWING UP CONTRACTS RELATING TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL TRANSFER OF KNOW-HOW IN THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY, U.N. Doc.
ECE/TRADE/222/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.70.II.E.15.
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production made to order, division of production and synchronization,
are present, creating a complementary arrangement of tasks. Conse-
quently, draw-back must be recognized as a type of industrial coopera-
tion, yet it cannot be categorized as subcontracting because production
steering by earlier contributions of a principal is missing. Additionally,
both production made to order and draw-back are not countertrade-
i.e., compensatory-transactions, as clearing of accounts will follow in
cash.
(3) Licensing with Payment in Resultant Products and Supply of
Complete Plants of Production Lines with Payment in Resultant
Products
Both licensing with payment in resultant products and supply of
complete plants or production lines with payment in resultant products
are steered production contracts. These contracts differ from subcon-
tracting or draw-back in that the tasks performed by the principal are
more complicated and complex in content.
When licensing in resultant products is used, the licensee is obli-
gated to pay for the license in manufactured goods over time.18 In a
contract for supply of complete plants or production lines with payment
in resultant products, one partner- the executor or recipient of order-
is obligated to perform all tasks necessary to create an industrial struc-
ture or technological line of specific parameters, and successively trans-
fer it to the investor. The investor is obligated to gradually compensate
the executor with goods produced.19 Often, the executor's tasks include
geological examination of the investment area; preparing works con-
nected with site location; elaboration of project documentation; supply of
materials, machinery and equipment; construction of facilities; assembly
of machinery, equipment and management; setting the structure in mo-
18 ANALYTICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 8-9; EAST-WEsT INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, supra
note 8, at 10; S. WYROBA, UMOWA EKSPORTU-IMPORTU KOMPLETMEGO OBIEKTU PRZEMYS-
LOWEGO (ExPORT-IMPORT CONTRACT FOR SUPPLY OF COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANT) 46-136
(1976); M. SOf4IAK & F. ZACHARIASIEWICZ, IMPORT KOMPLETNYCH OBIEKTW PRZEMYSLOWYCH
(IMPORT OF COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS) 73-82 (1977). See SAGADNIENIA PRAWNE EK-
SPORTU KOMPLETNYCH OBIEKT6W PRZEMYSLOWYCH (LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EXPORT OF COM-
PLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS) (M. Pazdan & A. Tynel eds. 1980); U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR
EUROPE, U.N. Doc. ECE/TRADE/117 U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.E.13.
19 As to the notion of the countertrade transaction, see Rajski, Cywilnoprawne problemy tran-
sakcji kompensacynych w miqdzynarodowym obrocie gospodarczym (Civil-Law Problems of Counter-
trade Transactions in International Economic Exchange) 1 PA'NSWO I PRAwo 30-39 (1985);
Soltysiuiski, Transakcje kompensacyne w handlu Wschdd-Zachdd (Countertrade Transactions in
East-West Trade), 3 RUCH PRAWNICZY EKONOMICZNY I SOCJOLOGICzNY 78-79 (1983); Flienger,
Der Kompensationsvertrag, in 4 HANDBUCH DER AUSSENHANDELSVERTFAGE 252-67 (1982);
Bielov, in PRAWOWYJE FORMY, supra note 5, at 114-19.
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tion; carrying out production simulation test; instruction of personnel;
and securing a supply of spare parts.
The earlier contributions of one party in the form of licensing or
supply of complete plants or production lines being repaid by the other
party with goods produced exclusively on the basis of these very contri-
butions do not, however, make these compensatory transactions counter-
trade contracts.2 ° Other elements must, therefore, be the cause of the
long term cooperative nature of industrial cooperation contracts. Such
elements would indicate that the parties did not pursue merely one ex-
tended transaction, but entered into long term cooperation, giving rise to
lasting synchronization of economic activities.
For these reasons licensing and the supply of complete plants or
production lines cannot be an exclusive contract target. The licensor or
supplier of complete plants must show an interest in the product of their
partner that goes beyond mere qualitative and quantitative receipt.21
This interest may be manifested in activities which induce persistent im-
provement of technology, product quality and a reduction of raw materi-
als consumption. The parties may undertake the improvement actions
separately, provided that they are mutually obligated to inform each
other of the means of performance and results attained. They may also
undertake joint actions. The latter case lays a foundation for stricter co-
operation in the future within a more complex cooperative framework.
B. Coproduction Contract
The coproduction contract consists of parallel production of the
same final product by two partners of equal technological and organiza-
tional abilities; each of them producing a different component of the
product.2 2 Research indicates that coproduction is a higher and more
complex form of cooperation.23 In East-West relations, two most fre-
quently occurring types of coproduction are based on a license being pro-
vided by the Western partner. In the first type of licensing arrangement,
the Eastern partner assembles components received from the Western
partner in accordance with the Western partner's directions. In the sec-
ond type, the Eastern partner produces a fixed number of components of
the future final product and supplies them to the Western partner, who
focuses exclusively on manufacturing the remaining components and
20 ANALYTICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-8; THE SCOPE OF TRADE-CREATING INDUSTRIAL
COOPERATION, supra note 8 at 8-9; EAST-WEST INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, supra note 8, at 4-5;
INDUSTRIELLE OST-WEST KOOPERATION, supra note 16, at 107-11; W. VON LINGELSHEIM-
SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 76.
21 ANALYTICAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 10; THE SCOPE OF TRADE-CREATING INDUSTRIAL
COOPERATION, supra note 8, at 9-11.
22 F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY, supra note 6, at 49.
23 W. VON LINGELSHEIM-SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 73-75.
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supplying them, in exchange, to the Eastern partner. Consequently, both
partners independently assemble the final product.
Coproduction is strictly bound to specialization. This relationship is
reflected in the way this contract is referred to in the documents of inter-
national organizations-i.e., coproduction and specialization.24 This
wording means that the provisions of the contract pertaining to speciali-
zation are as important as those relating to synchronization of the part-
ners' operations. As an element of cooperation, specialization may refer
both to the production of respective parts and to variants of the final
product.25 Specialization of parts requires the parties to exchange a pre-
determined quantity of produced cooperation elements, so that each may
manufacture the same final product. Specialization of variants exceeds
these borders because, irrespective of the circumstances stated above,
each party focuses on assembling different models of the final common
product.
The coproduction contract constitutes a separate category of com-
mercial activity than that of steered production for two reasons. Primar-
ily, in coproduction each party is the producer of both the final product
and its respective components, while in steered production one party is
the final product maker, the other is a producer of components. In addi-
tion, specialization has an independent and equal nature, while steered
production relies on the synchronization of economic operations of the
two parties.
C. Joint Venture Contract
The distinctive feature of the joint venture contract is the obligation
of the parties to perform joint actions in order to attain a common eco-
nomic effect created while economic and legal separateness of the parties
is preserved. In order to reach the common economic effect, that the
parties must have, not merely convergent, but identical objectives. The
common nature of the their actions is reflected by combined parallel eco-
nomic activities, instead of reciprocal tasks. The activities of joint ven-
turers are limited related exclusively to the common undertaking.26
The joint venture is considered identical to capital cooperation, an
activity based on the merger of capital outlays as well as technical, orga-
nizational and commercial skills. A joint account of losses and gains
from capital cooperation reflects the joint sharing of risks involved in the
24 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25 W. VON LINGELSHEIM-SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 75-76; F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY,
supra note 6, at 49; INDUSTRIELLE OST-WEST KOOPERATION, supra note 16, at 122; M. ScHMrCT,
supra note 14, at 82-83.
26 THE SCOPE OF TRADE-CREATING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, supra note 8, at 10-11;
EAST-WEST INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, supra note 8, at 13-16.
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undertaking.27
The distinctive feature of joint ventures is the sharing of the newly
created economic unit. The partners jointly govern this economic unit
and keep a common account of losses and gains, all of which leads to the
identification of their objectives. In an economic sense, the unit is sepa-
rate, but as a rule it has no separate legal status.28
No common view has been adopted vis-h-vis the legal content of a
joint venture, which is widely understood to be a contractual joint ven-
ture, a partnership or a proprietorship. 29 However, most authors view
joint ventures in narrow terms, considering them a separate legal class
close to partnership.3 ° Yet, they differ from partnership in being more
limited in range and durability and being less formal.31 Though a con-
tract makes up the basis of the rights and duties of the parties in a joint
venture-i.e., joint venture comes to being only ex contractu- partner-
ship rules still may be applicable. This result is possible since a joint
venture constitutes no new specific legal regulation when compared to a
partnership. Some authors equate joint ventures with partnerships. 3 2
Others stress that joint ventures should be narrowed to mean contractual
joint ventures which would limit the parties' rights to the contract, any
unresolved questions resolved by the general principles of contract law.33
The latter view is the best reflection of the contract of manufacture coop-
eration, a new legal category, which has been made distinctive from part-
nership or proprietorship through contractual practice.
1 27 E. TABACZYI SKI, KOOPERACJA PRZEMYSLOWA Z ZAGRANICA (INDUSTRIAL COOPERA-
TION ABROAD) 92 (1976).
28 See, e.g., Brown, International Joint Venture Contracts in English Law, 5 DROIT ET PRA-
TIQUE DU COMMERCE INT'L 155 (1979); P. NORTON, SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS 58-61 (1979); E. HERZFELD, JOINT VENTURES 7 (1983); C. MELCHER, DIE JOINT
VENTURE VEREINBARUNG UNTER BESONDERER BERtKSICHTIGUNG IHRES BESTANDES NACH IN-
KORPORATION 5 (1971); Erhardt, Joint East-West Ventures, in OSTEUROPA, GEMEINSCHAFTSUN-
TERNEHMEN IM RAHMEN DER INDUSTRIELLEN OST-WEST KOOPERATION 13-18 (1977); L. 0.
BAPTISTA & P. DURAND-BARTHEZ, LES ASSOCIATIONS D'ENTREPRISES (JOINT VENTURES) DANS
LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 3-20 (1986); N. N. WOZNIESIENSKAJA, SMIESHANNYJE PRED-
PRIIATIIA KAK FORMA MEZHDUNARODNOVO EKONOMITSCHESKOVO SOTRUDNITCHESTVA (MIXED
VENTURES AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION) 27-33 (1986).
29 G. STEDMAN & J. JONES, SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS 151-57 (1986); E. HERZFELD,
supra note 28, at 35-41; G. CABANELLAS, JOINT BUSINESS VENTURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
LATIN AMERICA, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 2-8 (1978).
30 H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES 63-65 (1961); J. A. CRANE & A. R. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 189-95 (1968); Sive,
in ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP 463-84 (1960).
31 J. A. CRANE & A. R. BROMBERG, supra note 30, at 189-95; Sive, supra note 30, at 481-84; C.
ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 2, 28-31 (1986).
32 W. G. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 5-6
(1961); G. CABANELLAS, supra note 29, at 6-8.
33 McPherson, in EQUITY AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP 19-47 (P.D. Finn ed. 1986); G.
STEDMAN & J. JONES, supra note 29, at 150-51.
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Due to the following factors, joint ventures have rapidly expanded
in East-West as well as East-West-South practice. First, foreign capital is
provided with stronger security because it merges with local capital.
This security guarantees state support of the joint venture, instead of a
restrictive policy. Second, the receiving state, as a rule the socialist or
developing state, does not formally limit its authority to the imperious
("imperium") sphere only, but as a co-owner of the undertaking extends
its rights to the private law sphere ("dominium"). For these reasons
joint ventures have become almost routine in cases of tripartite East-
West-South cooperation, thereby comprising most joint tendering and
joint projects.34 Recently, joint ventures are becoming more common in
East-West relations since most socialist states now admit foreign capital
on their territory."
The need of special laws providing express regulation of joint ven-
tures is needed because the socialist state has a monopoly over foreign
trade. When adopted, such special laws are called "legal regulations of
joint venture with foreign capital shares." These regulations vary as
these are parliament-created enactments in Poland and Yugoslavia; state-
ments provided by the Head of State in the USSR, Bulgaria and Ruma-
nia; and ministerial department dispositions in Hungary.
The regulations provide limits on foreign capital import, which may
consist of. obligating the parties to the joint venture to obtain the appro-
priate administrative branch permission; excluding the joint venture
from certain domains of economic life; demanding only a minority share
be owned by the foreign investor; and introducing upper limits for for-
eign investment, foreign capital outlays, and for the transfer of gains
abroad. These regulations are constantly changing, with the tendency
towards the liberalization and cancellation of the aforementioned limits.
Regardless of the potential for improvements, at present the situation is
far from being satisfactory.36
Each of the above regulations focuses on controlling the content of
34 THE SCOPE OF TRADE-CREATING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, supra note 8, at 17-21;
EAST-WEST INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, supra note 8, at 29-50.
35 Kuss, Dos Joint-venture-Recht der osteuropdischen Staaten Rechtsgrundlagen und Praxis im
Uberblick, 51 RABELSZErrsCHRiFr 548-602 (1987); Rajski, Rozw'oj prawa dotyczqcego zagrani-
canych inwestycji gospodarczych w panristwach socjalistycznych (Development of Legal Regulations
Concerning Foreign Economic Investments in the Socialist States), 3 PA'NSWO I PRAWO 60-71 (1986);
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION 32 (D. Camp-
bell ed. 1986); Buzescu, Joint Venture in Eastern Europe, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 407-47 (1984). The
only country that has no such a regulation is the GDR.
36 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. For example, the requirement of minority share
by the foreign investor can still be found in the legal regulations of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia
and Rumania, as well as in Hungary, although the laws of the latter provide, in exceptional cases, for
a possibility of giving up this requirement. The requirement was abandoned by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria
and Poland.
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the joint venture contract but fails to provide for socialist state guaran-
tees to foreign capital, and answers to questions on the governance and
taxation of joint ventures. As for the problems unsolved by the contract,
some regulations point to partnership law as being applicable. Often,
these provisions of commerical law date back prior to 1945, and thus
include norms pertaining to partnership under capitalist commercial
laws-i.e., partnership, limited liability company and joint stock
company.37
As industrial cooperation contracts constitute a separate legal cate-
gory, they differ from steered production or coproduction contracts. The
parties to industrial cooperation contracts pursue a common goal while
in the other two contracts, the goals pursued by the parties are, at best,
merely convergent but not identical. In joint ventures, the tasks of each
party focus on a commonly achieved goal, not tasks providing reciprocal
benefits to the achievement of parallel goals. The joint nature of the ac-
tions performed by the parties, as well as the pursued common goal, ac-
count for considering joint ventures to be the most developed form of
industrial cooperation.
III. CONTENT OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION CONTRACT
Two groups of issues must be addressed in every industrial coopera-
tion contract: preparatory tasks-preparation of cooperation, and mu-
tual tasks to be performed by the parties should be determined
(implementation of cooperation).38 If these two groups can be addressed
in one document, the result is the complex industrial cooperation con-
tract.39 This consolidation is possible usually only in cases of simple co-
37 In Poland the limited liability company and the joint stock company are governed by some
remaining provisions to the Commercial Code of 1934. In Rumania the joint stock company is ruled
by the provisions of the Commercial Code of 1887. In Hungary the limited liability company is
governed by the Law of 1930, but the joint stock company by the Commercial Code of 1875. For
more details on this subject, see Kuss, supra note 35, at 562-65 and the literature mentioned therein.
38 Wlodyka, Spdr o pojqie kooperacji gospodarczej i umowy koaperacyne] (Dispute on the Notion
of Economic Cooperation and a Contract of Cooperation), 3 PA'NSWO I PRAwo 39-40 (1986) [herein-
after Wlodyka, Spdr o pojqie]. Likewise J. Poczobut and A. W. Wigniewski focused on the distinc-
tion between two groups of provisions characteristic of the contracts for industrial cooperation. See
Poczobut & Wigniewski, On the Legal Character of the Contract of Cooperation and the Perspectives
of its Regulation, 12 POLISH Y. B. INT'L L. 201-06 (1983). Nevertheless, the two authors narrow the
essence of the contract of industrial cooperation to the first group of the aforementioned provisions.
See J. POCZOBUT, UMOWY KOOPERACJI PRZEMYSLOWEJ Z FIMAMI KAPITALISTYCZHYMI-
WYBRANE ZAGADNIENIA PRAWNE (INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH CAPITALIST
FIRMS- SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS) 185-86, 192-93 (1982). See also Pazdan, Umowa kooperacji
w polskim prawie prywatnym miedzynarodowym (The Cooperation Contract in the Polish Private In-
ternational Law), in PRAWNE PROBLEMY KOOPERACJI PRZEMYSLOWEJ (LEGAL PROBLEMS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION) 134-35 (1981).
39 Wlodyka, Die internationalen Kooperationsvertrdge in den Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen
Ost und West, 25 JAHRBUCH FOR OSTRECHT 71-75 (1984) [hereinafter Wlodyka, Die internationalen
Vol. 21:87
THE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION IN EAST-WEST TRADE
operation such as draw-back or subcontracting. In such cases the
contract has a lasting and composite character. If, however, the prepara-
tory actions are regulated by a series of agreements and not by one con-
tract, the arrangement is labelled a cooperation contract concluded by
stages.4° This contract is used in more compound cases of cooperation
such as delivery of complete plants or production lines. This pattern
should be defined as a chain of contracts.
A. The Complex Industrial Cooperation Contract
The complex industrial cooperation contract is contained in one
document. Following the regular contractual pattern, this contract con-
sists of a preamble, essential section and concluding statements. Its title
states the designation of the contract and precise definition of the parties.
The preamble is particularly important, as it gives the objective of the
cooperation and defines contract terms, thus useful in filling in future
contract gaps.41 In the essential section, the so-called major and acces-
sory or side clauses are differentiated.'
The major clauses focus primarily on the manner and synchroniza-
tion of the tasks to be performed, as well as on the settling of accounts
between the parties. The content may differ depending on the type of
industrial cooperation. Each task to be performed requires quantitative
and qualitative determinations and specifics as to place, date and the way
of receiving the tasks. These determinations often require special techni-
cal knowledge which accounts for a number of subject-matter annexes to
the contract.
(1) Synchronization Clauses
Among the major clauses of industrial cooperation contracts there
should be synchronizing clauses which prepare the exchange of mutual
tasks. They should contain standardizing agreements relating to the pro-
duction operations as well as specialization agreements. By means of the
latter the parties are obligated to focus their economic activity on manu-
facturing determined goods or rendering determined services in order to
improve quality and reduce cost (positive specialized obligation) or stop
activities in the domain of the other cooperator (negative specialized obli-
Kooperaionsvertrdge]. See also S. WLODYKA, II PRAWO GOSPODARCZE, ZARYS SYSTEMU, CZMS(15
OG6LNA (ECONOMIC LAW, AN OUTLINE OF THE SYSTEM, THE GENERAL PART) 374-76 (1982).
40 Wlodyka, Die internationalen Kooperationsvertrdge, supra note 39, at 75-79. See also II
PRAWO GOSPODARCZE, ZARYS SYSTEMU, CZfSt OG6LNA, supra note 39, at 376-83; B. TEYSSIE, LES
GROUPES DE CONTRATS 41-133, 295-98 (1975).
41 Dubisson, Les characteresjuridiques du contrat de coopdration en matire industrielle et com-
merciale, 10 DPCI 303-05, 317 (1984) [hereinafter Dubisson, Les charactfesjuridiques; W. VON
LINGELSHEIM-SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 103-04.
42 Wlodyka, Die internationalen Kooperationsvertrdge, supra note 39, at 73-75.
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gation). In both cases, the cooperators may secure for themselves the
delivery of specialized products in the form of cooperation elements or
market guarantees for their products within the cooperation
relationship.43
Synchronization clauses may list certain elements of joint actions
such as shared research, joint marketing or joint servicing of a product.
These actions testify to a specific community of interests between the
parties; a community resulting entirely from the synchronized
operations.'
(2) Account Settling Clauses
The last group of major clauses contained in the industrial coopera-
tion contract are the account settling clauses which regulate the way the
value of performed tasks is registered, and the way each partner is to be
rewarded. In East-West relations the settling accounts mechanisim in
the form of counter-performed tasks is of particular importance. The
mechanism results in the economically weaker partner being granted the
means for production (deliveries and financial supplies) on credit condi-
tions provided by the stronger partner. The credit is subsequently repaid
by the weaker partner manufacturing final products for the benefit of the
stronger partner. Compensatory settling of accounts may also take form
of an appropriate division of jointly achieved profits.45 The compensa-
tory character of accounts settling is not necessarily an attribute of coop-
eration. Yet the repayment of the obtained credit (utilized as the means
for purchasing technology, machines and equipment) through the return
of manufactured goods has become almost a routine in East-West coop-
eration transactions. This repayment method proves particulary advan-
tageous for the socialist partner whose currency is, as a rule,
nonconvertible.
(3) Accessor Clauses
The bulk of the contract is occupied, however, by accessor clauses.
They regulate the legal entity formed between the parties as a result of
preparing and performing the tasks envisaged by the major clauses. The
following groups of contractual statements should be listed among the
accessory clauses:
a. clauses pointing to the establishment between the parties of
the lasting community of interest;
43 ECE GUIDE supra note 9, 24-25; see also Poczobut & Wigniewski, supra note 38, at 199-
201.
44 ECE GUIDE, supra note 9, 25.
45 Id. 1 48-49.
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b. clauses referring to the long term character of industrial co-
operation contract;
c. clauses binding the international nature of industrial coopera-
tion contract; and
d. clauses that may be found in other economic contracts.
Among the clauses indicating that a lasting commmunity of inter-
ests is coming into existence between the parties, it is possible to list the
consultation clause, protection clause, the clause demanding that tasks be
performed by each partner, and the loyalty clause. These clauses prove
particularly significant in legally identifying the industrial cooperation
contract because they are illustrative of a lasting community of interests
between the parties. Though expressed in the content of the discussed
clauses in an indirect manner, this feature is nevertheless their logical
consequence.
The consultation clause exists because the tasks to be performed on
the basis of cooperation contract are complex, yet must be complemen-
tary. A division of a production process between the partners gives rise
to the need for a synchronization of operations which, in a technical
sense, may be reached only by a constant exchange of information. The
need for exchange is heightened because modem technological processes
are, as a rule, compound and complicated. The more complex the indus-
trial cooperation contract is, the larger the need is to adopt consultation
procedures." The consultation clause may be traced to the principle of
partnership loyalty.47 It also may be traced to the long lasting nature4 8
and evolving character of the industrial cooperation contract.49 The
ECE Guide, in an exempli gratia manner, hints at available consultation
procedures such as joint meetings of representatives of both partners,
joint commissions established in view of the necessity to maintain stable
contacts between the partners or specially formed commercial consortia
without separate legal status or with the status of a partnership.50 The
content of the consultation clause may be considered tantamount to ex-
pressing a willingness to talk on specific subjects connected with the per-
formance of obligations or to the duty to inform a partner of all the facts
that are essential for joint production. 1
46 Jakubowski, supra note 5, at 272; Calue, Pojecie kooperaci przemyslowej w stosunkach
Wschdd-Zachod Aspekty ekonomiczne i prawne (A Notion of Industrial Cooperation in East-West
Relations, Economic and Legal Aspects), 12 PROBLEMYANDLU ZAGRANICZNEGO 70 (1979).
47 Mercadal, Les charactdristiques juridiques des contrats internationaux de cooperation indus-
trielle, 10 DPCI 331-36 (1984).
48 V. VON LINGELSHEIM-SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 104-05.
49 Babiuc, The Contract of International Economic Cooperation, 25 REVUE ROUMAINE DES
SCIENCES SOCIALS, SCIENCES JURIDIQUE 189 (1981).
5O ECE GUIDE, supra note 9, u 15, 32-33.
51 W. VON LINGELSHEIM-SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 104-05.
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Inclusion of the protection clause in the contract obligates parties to
protect technological and organizational information obtained from a
partner within the scope of industrial cooperation. The clause may be
extended by adding a duty to raise claims against third parties who trans-
gress upon the protected information. The protection clause is tied to the
clause requiring the performance of tasks by a partner; subcontracting is
not permitted. In order to synchronize production parties must necessar-
ily make the production secrets available to each other. As performance
of some synchronization obligations by a third party would transgress
upon the very substance of industrial cooperation, this clause is neces-
sary. The clause does not prohibit the partners from contracting-out cer-
tain expected fragments of their tasks, the ordering partner being liable
for the fragment costs as though they are self-performed.12 In this con-
text the loyalty clause also becomes significant, requiring the one partner
to consider the interests of the other whenever any economic decision
bound with production cooperation is made. Thus, the principle of loy-
alty exceeds the boundaries of good faith, and acts as a directive control-
ling performance for tasks arising from the industrial cooperation
contract.
53
Durability clauses of the industrial cooperation contract delineate
the life span of the contract and list any hardship provisions. The latter
exists because of the long lasting character of the industrial cooperation
relationship and the tendency toward constant change of its content.54
As a result of unstable economic conditions, present contractual practice
often consists of repeated transmutations of compound and long lasting
contracts. It is argued that the negotiation phase is not ended upon the
signing of the contract but is extended to the whole period of the con-
tract. As a result, the content of such a contract cannot be unchanging
but must be subject to specific evolution." Hardship provisions include
the duty of the parties to renegotiate the contract in order to adopt it to
changed circumstances. These provisions thus provide a mechanism for
52 M. DUBISSON, LEs GROUPMENTS D'ENTERPRISES POUR LES MARCHf-S INTERNATIONAUX
21-22 (1979); Calue, supra note 46, at 39; Babiuc, supra note 49, at 180-81.
53 Dubisson, Les charactires juridiques, supra note 41, at 305-07; Mercadal, supra note 47, at
331-33.
54 Durand-Barthez, La durde des accords de cooperation et les clauses governant leur adapta-
tion, 10 DPCI 357-58 (1984); Dabin, Accords de cooperation inter entreprises pour la realisation de
marchds internationaux, 5 DPCI 344 (1979); Dubisson, Les charactiresjuridiques, supra note 41, at
359; Jakubowski, supra note 5, at 274; Babiuc, supra note 49, at 19.
55 Rajski, Wplyw rozwoju handlu miedynarodowego na teorie zobowiazad (The Impact of the
Development of International Trade on the Theory of Obligations), in STUDIA Z PRAWA
ZOBOWIAZAMI (STUDIES ON LAW OF OBLIGATIONS) 167 (1979); J. D'HERBES & J. Touscoz, LES
CONTRACTS INTERNATIONAUX DE COOPERATION INDUSTRIELLE ET LE NOUVEL ORDRE
ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONAL 174 (1980); Durand-Barthez, supra note 54, at 357-58.
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filling the contractual gaps.5 6
The clauses of permission, applicable law, arbitration and language
of communication between the parties belong to the category of clauses
that are bound to the international character of the industrial coopera-
tion contract. These types of clauses can be also found in other interna-
tional contracts concluded between enterprises from different countries.
The permission clause deserves, however, particular attention when
a partner to the contract comes from a country with a planned economy.
In view of the monopoly of the socialist state in foreign trade, the validity
in international relations of each contract concluded by the Eastern part-
ner would depend on the permission obtained from appropriate govern-
ments offices steering the country's economy. Pursuant to the permission
clause, the Eastern partner is obligated to the Western partner to ear-
nestly apply to the appropriate authorities for the needed permission.57
All contracts, international or not, include clauses regulating the lia-
bility of the parties for nonperformance or inadequate performance of
obligations; clauses relating to the problem of exclusion of liability in
case of, for example, force majeur; and clauses determining the principles
of withdrawal from or cancellation of the contract.
B. The Industrial Cooperation Contract Concluded by Stages
The cooperation contract concluded by stages has four basic peri-
ods, though, in fact, the number and substance of stages may vary de-
pending on the circumstances of a specific case. Among the basic
portions are: the information agreement; the preparatory agreement;
frame contract of industrial cooperation; and the implementation
contract."
(1). Information Agreements
In information agreements, parties are obligated to examine the pos-
sibility and expediency of concluding an industrial cooperation contract
between them. The negotiations of this examination must be carried on
in good faith and include: a duty to inform the partner of all facts indis-
pensable to a decision on accepting the contract; a ban on suggesting
proposals aimed at obstructing the negotiations; a ban on impeding the
56 See, ag., Fontaine, Hardship Clause, 2 DPCI 51-88 (1976); Schmitthoff, Hardship and In-
tervener Clause, 1980 J. Bus. L. 52-58 (1980); Lando, Renegotiation and Revision of International
Contracts, 23 GERMAN Y. B. INT'L L. 135-37; Horn, Standard Clauses on Contract Adaptation in
International Commerce, in ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 131-37 (N. Horn ed. 1986).
57 Wlodyka, Die internationalen kooperationsvertrge, supra note 39, at 73; W. VON LINGEL-
SHEIM-SEIBICKE, supra note 14, at 115.
58 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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negotiations without significant cause; a ban on carrying on simultaneous
negotiations relating to similar contracts with another prospective part-
ner; and a duty to keep the information on the negotiations (and the
negotiations themselves) secret.59
(2). Preparatory Agreements
In preparatory agreements, parties settle the question of whether the
industrial cooperation contract can actually be concluded. Depending
on the decision, parties may also perform certain preparatory operations
within the framework of this agreement. For instance, parties may in-
clude standardizing or specialized adjustments, both positive and nega-
tive. Irrespective of the above, parties may have already at this stage,
determined the consultation procedure related to the adaptation of eco-
nomically weaker partner to the technological and organizational level of
stronger partner.6°
(3). Frame Industrial Cooperation Contract
Pursuant to its name, the frame industrial cooperation contract pro-
vides the legal frame work for the future industrial cooperation between
the parties. The frame character of the contract is demonstrated by its
general phraseology relating to the parties' tasks. The determination of
tasks is limited to unspecified indications of the objective, and the means
of implementing it (place and date, quantitative and qualitative examina-
tion, proofs testifying that they are being in fact performed). The bulk of
a frame contract is occupied by accessory clauses. The latter are conclu-
sively formulated and require no further specifying.61
(4). Implementation Contracts
The generality of the frame industrial cooperation contract requires
specification of the parties' tasks and duties in the implementation con-
tract. Only this specification allows performance of the very task which
prompted cooperation. Implementation contracts usually assume the
form of a contract for carrying out specific tasks (sale or delivery) or for
rendering specific services.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COOPERATION CONTRACT
The cooperation contract has been regulated neither in the domestic
legislation of any country nor in international law. As a result, the con-
59 Morin, Le devoir de cooperation dans les contrats interationaux, 6 DPCI 10-12 (1980).
60 Wlodyka, Die internationalen Kooperationsvertrdge, supra note 39, at 76-77.
61 Jakubowski, supra note 5, at 275-76; Babiuc, supra note 49, at 187-90.
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tent has been shaped exclusively by contractual practice. Certain stable
and repeated features have laid foundations for recognition of the indus-
trial cooperation contract as a separate and empirical type of contract.62
Yet the specific legal content of relationships arising from this contract
can not be classified among these stable features because legal content
varies depending on the circumstances of a specific joint venture. What
is therefore determinative of the separateness of the industrial coopera-
tion contract in contract law is a constant and repeated economic rela-
tionship, existing under the principle of equivalence. For this reason,
regulation of industrial cooperation contracts in the international forum
was attempted. These attempts by no means resembled the Code-like
regulation of contracts in Continental law. The ECE Guide is an exam-
ple of such an attempt.63 Other similar attempts are the CMEA General
Conditions of Specialization and Cooperation in Production Between En-
terprises of the Member State of the CMEA of 1979 ("CMEA Condi-
tions")," and the CMEA Guide on Drawing up Contracts Concerning
the Different Kinds of Cooperation in Production Between Economic
Organizations of the Member-States of the CMEA of 1987 ("CMEA
Guide"). 5
Two of these attempts assumed the form of a guide on drawing up
contracts, and one took the shape of addressing general conditions. All
of them are of regional nature because they refer exclusively either to
Europe in East-West relations or only to cooperation within the CMEA.
The consequences of the latter may have impact on East-West relation-
ships. The guides, in their substance, are conceived to be ancillary
materials helpful to the parties drawing up the clauses of a specific con-
tract. For this reason they usually determine the subject matter of the
contract and subsequently focus, above all else, on indicating the content
of the respective clauses that should be contained by the parties in a con-
tract. When viewed in formal terms the guides use a descriptive method
resembling a commentary rather than a set of legal rules. It is justifiably
doubtful whether the guides on drawing up contracts may be at all classi-
fied as legal regulation. Such classification would be possible only by
adopting a wide understanding of the sources of international trade law66
62 Wlodyka, Sj or o pojqie, supra note 38, at 42-43.
63 ECE GUIDE, supra note 9. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
64 CMEA GENERAL CONDITIONS OF SPECIALIZATION AND COOPERATION IN PRODUCTION
BETWEEN ENTERPRISES OF MEMBER STATES OF THE CMEA OF 1979, Accepted by the Executive
Committee of the CMEA, Jan. 18, 1979, The Secretariat of the CMEA, Moscow 1979 [hereinafter
CMEA CONDITIONS].
65 CMEA Guide on Drawing up Contracts Concerning Different Kinds of Cooperation on
Production Between Economic Organizations of the Member-States of the CMEA of 1982, The
Secretariat of the CMEA, Moscow 1988 [hereinafter CMEA GUIDE].
66 CMEA GUIDE, supra note 65 § 1.
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or by accepting the concept of lex mercatoria.67 The guides would then
fall within the scope of "soft law."' 68 The aforementioned CMEA Condi-
tions are the only source regulating industrial cooperation contracts that
cannot be called into question. The CMEA Conditions were adopted in
the shape of a resolution passed by an international organization and
were subsequently incorporated into the domestic law of the member
states.69 The Conditions should therefore be recognized as a normative
act.
The ECE Guide is a relatively extensive act. It consists of six chap-
ters and sixty-five sections. The two first chapters are general, determin-
ing the scope of the Guide and the basic features of international
industrial cooperation contracts. These chapters also deal with the
problems that should be examined before concluding such contracts,
such as the nature of cooperation in the technological, production and
market spheres. The subsequent chapters deal in detail with such
problems as triparite cooperation and cooperation in exploiting natural
resources. The last chapter is concerned with financial questions, such as
the impact of changed circumstances on industrial cooperation contracts,
termination of the contracts, appropriate law and settlement of disputes.
The CMEA Guide is characterized by a similar range of problems
dealt with and by a similar arrangement of statements. The CMEA
Guide consists of sixty-one chapters and covers such questions as charac-
teristic features of contracts for international industrial cooperation, legal
types and forms of such contracts, preparation of the process of conclud-
ing them, the conclusion itself and their entry in force. Most of the docu-
ment concerns itself with systematizing the parties' tasks into three fields:
scientific and technical cooperation; production; and marketing. Consid-
erable space is devoted to the parties' liability for nonperformance or
inadequate performance of tasks as well as organizational forms of coop-
eration. In addition, the CMEA Guide also deals with the settlement of
disputes, appropriate law, change and termination of international coop-
eration contracts and the prolongation of the time for contract
termination.
Though it is limited only to industrial cooperation between the en-
terprises of socialist states, the CMEA Guide may be deemed a remarka-
ble step forward with respect to the legal separation of the industrial
cooperation contract from other types of con tracts. The CMEA Guide
definition of the industrial cooperation contract as well as the parties'
rights and duties confirm the typical separateness of the industrial coop-
67 Id. § 2.
68 Id. § 3.
69 CMEA CONDITIONS, supra note 64 § 13, pos. 1.
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eration contract. 70 The CMEA Guide provides for basic types of indus-
trial cooperation contracts such as subcontracting, which is tantamount
to coproduction, and common production which may be identified with
joint venture. 71 The Guide also indicates variants of the industrial coop-
eration contract in the shape of a full contract as well as that of one
concluded by stages. 72 The practical value of the CMEA Guide is en-
riched by the fact that the CMEA Guide is not confined to instructing
the parties on how to draft the respective contractual clauses but also
provides completed formulations of some of the more complicated con-
tractual fragments by enclosing exemplary solutions.
The CMEA Conditions provide a different presentation of the sepa-
rateness of industrial cooperation contracts. The CMEA Conditions
consist of eleven chapters and contain fifty-eight paragraphs. The chap-
ters deal with the following problems: general provision; parties to the
contract; conclusion of the contract; change and entry in force of the
contract; parties' rights and duties; parties' liability; claims and their lim-
itations; termination of the contract; arbitration; appropriate law; and
miscellaneous provisions. Unlike the CMEA Guide, the CMEA Condi-
tions do not pursue the goal of instructing the parties in how to draft
contractual clauses but do contain completed statements relating, in par-
ticular, to the implementation of the contract. The CMEA Conditions
are in fact not those of cooperation among socialist countries, but rather
specialization. This situation is due to the specific traits of cooperation
among socialist countries, which are based on planned economies and
necessity to coordinate the plans. As a result, duties of the parties that
would be bound with integrating the divided manufacturing process into
one entity are not found in the CMEA Conditions. According to the
CMEA Conditions, the specialized partner undertakes the obligation to
secure the production of specialized products in order to meet the de-
mands of the nonspecialized partner.73 The latter guarantees purchase
the totality of the aforementioned products.74 The nonspecialized party
may also be obligated to stop or refrain in the future from producing
specialized products. 75 As the CMEA Conditions are being found unfit
70 Id. § 15, pos. 1.
71 Id. § 15, pos. 2.
72 M. M. BOGUSLAWSKT, MIEZHDUNARODNOJE EKONOMITSCHESKOJE PRAW (INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC LAW) 63-64 (1986).
73 The abundant literature provides for a lot of examples. See, eg., Goldman, Lex Mercatoria,
3 F. INT'L 3-24 (1983); Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Arbitration, 34 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 747-68 (1985).
74 See Seidl-Hohenveldem, International Economic "Soft Law," 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 178-
238 (1980); Fikentscher, Wirtschafisrecht, I WELTWIRTSCHAFSRECHT UND EUROPAISCHES WIRT-
SCHAFrSRECHT 67-70 (1983).
75 In the case of Poland it was realized by the Resolution of the Council of the Ministers No.
161 of October 5, 1979, MONITOR POLSKI, No. 28, item 143 (1979).
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for specific traits of industrial cooperation contracts, attempts are being
made to amend them.
The International Polish Commercial Code project provides a nor-
mative example of the separateness of the industrial cooperation contract
in domestic law.76 Chapter XIII of the Code is wholly devoted to the
industrial cooperation contract which is treated as an equal type of con-
tract vis-A-vis a series of contracts listed in the Code. The chapter begins
with listing the essential elements of the industrial cooperation contract
and proceeds to describe the contract in a typical code-like manner.77
The list of essential elements actually provides for features that are dis-
tinctive of the cooperation contract and prove sufficient to prevent classi-
fying this contract as any other type of contract. When viewed in terms
of earlier attempts, this solution may be considered unique. Such a thesis
seems justified in view of the fact that the previous code regulations of
international economic trade, as found in other socialistic countries, fully
resigned from defining the industrial cooperation contract because the
legislators detected in it no such traits that would allow for its typologi-
cal separateness. 78 t
76 Burzyfiski, Industrial Cooperation, New Legal Development in Poland, 12 POLISH Y. B.
INT'L L. 225-31 (1983).
77 In the Draft of the Law on Civil-Law Relations in International Trade, it is article 280 that
provides for the definition of contracts for industrial cooperation. According to this article:
By a contac[t] for cooperation the parties undertake to enter long-range collaboration aim-
ig at the exchange of economically inter-related performances, in particular
1. They undertake to obtain and exchange specific information;
2. They undertake to introduce specific changes into their economic operations;
3. They determine principles of cooperation.
78 See Enderlein, Zur rechtlichen Regelun des internationalen kooperationsvertrages im kfiftigen
Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz der DDR, 1970 STAAT UND RECHT 25 (1970).
t By agreement, the Journal has relied on the author for the veracity of the statements con-
tained herein.
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